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I. Introduction 
 
Several studies in different countries have confirmed that individuals earn 
higher wages the higher their level of formal education. Returns to 
education are mostly estimated per year of completed schooling as in the 
common Mincer wage equation. The most common explanation for the 
wage effect of education has been that schooling increases employee 
productivity, an idea usually associated with the human capital theory.  
In real life however, an employer setting the wage or salary of a new 
employee does not ask for years of schooling but for a school leaving 
certificate, high school diploma or university degree. Screening theories, in 
turn, assume that educational achievement can be used to predict individual 
productivity, as the individual’s true productivity cannot be monitored 
without some significant cost. When there is uncertainty  about an 
individual employee’s true productivity, employers use educational 
achievement as a screening device. Employees in their turn will use their 
educational credentials as a signal to employers of their potential 
productivity.  
It could be argued, however, that years of schooling are too crude an 
instrument for estimating returns to education. Years of schooling are not 
the basis for employers’ wage setting and the implied linearity of wages by 
years of schooling is not verified by data. Individuals who have the same 
number of years of schooling or the same certificates of education can vary 
widely in level of productivity. This suggests that the appropriate approach 
to estimating returns to education is to separate the screening or signaling 
effects of educational credentials (such as diplomas) from the productivity 
effects of education.  
In the literature, the returns to specific credentials of education rather 
than accumulated years of schooling are often referred to as “sheepskin 
effects” (see for example Hungerford & Solon, (1987)). The term follows 
from the tradition in the US of presenting diplomas on parchment, usually 
made from the skin of a sheep. This also means that wages are not 
necessarily a linear function of time spent in school. 
Several US studies have confirmed the existence of non-linearities in 
the return to schooling (e.g. Hungerford & Solon, (1987), Jaeger & Page, 
(1996) and Park, (1999)) and these non-linearities have been attributed to 
sheepskin effects. But in most of the previous empirical work on estimating 
sheepskin effects, the actual diploma effects have not been taken into 
consideration due to limitations in the data used. Absence of adequate data has 
meant that sheepskin effects are usually defined as disproportionately large 
increases in returns to schooling after the completion of a certain year of   2
schooling such as the 8
th, 12
th or 16
th, which usually lead to some kind of 
diploma.  
Another potential flaw in previous studies of sheepskin effects seems to 
be that they have overlooked the presence of an actual ‘education’ effect 
from receipt of a diploma. Implicitly, individuals who receive a diploma or 
a degree have had a longer education. This suggests that previous research 
might have overestimated the sheepskin effects by not considering this 
education effect. But this potential flaw can easily be overcome by using a 
well-known wage decomposition procedure.  
A key issue concerning the signaling value of educational credentials 
is how quickly the employers learn about a employee’s true productivity. A 
reasonable hypothesis is that the employer uses the individuals’ tenure in 
the firm as an indicator. As employees’ tenures in the firm increase, the 
employer can directly observe the true productivity differences among 
them. This additional information about true individual productivity can 
then be used to correct individual wages. As a result, the wage-screening 
role of educational credentials should diminish over time. Two previous 
empirical studies using US data have found support for this hypothesis 
(Belman & Heywood, (1997) and Liu & Wong, (1982)). Outside the US 
labor market this issue has not been subject to any empirical investigation. 
This paper examines the existence of sheepskin effects in the Swedish 
labor market using the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey, which 
includes explicit information on the individuals’ highest diploma, years of 
schooling and hourly wage. In contrast to previous studies, this paper takes 
potential education effects into consideration when estimating sheepskin 
effects by using the Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition method. The 
paper also empirically investigates the attenuation of sheepskin effects with 
increasing tenure when employers learn about each individual’s true 
productivity. This is done by estimating the sheepskin effects conditional 
upon years of tenure in the current firm. 
The main findings of this paper are as follows. There is Swedish evidence 
to support sheepskin effects both at the university and high school levels. 
There is also evidence in estimations of the sheepskin effect using previous 
methods that an education effect is involved. Finally, the paper reports 
evidence of diminishing sheepskin effects with tenure in the current firm.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the different 
approaches used in previous studies to estimate sheepskin effects in the 
return to schooling are discussed and a new approach is suggested. Section 
three describes the data. Section four applies the new approach to estimate 
the sheepskin effects in the Swedish material and Section five investigates 
how quickly they will diminish. In Section six conclusions are presented.   3
II. Estimating sheepskin effects. 
 
The most common approach when estimating the return to schooling is 
based on the Mincer human capital wage equation: 
 
ln aße iiii wSX l =+++                        (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings. Si 
denotes years of schooling, while  b is interpreted as the wage premium 
from an additional year of schooling.  X is a vector including additional 
explanatory variables and l is a vector of parameters.  
The specification of schooling in equation (1) assumes that the return 
to schooling is a linear function of time spent in school. In investigating 
potential non-linear returns to schooling, the common approach is to 
estimate a wage equation, which specifies the schooling variable as:  
 
ln aß()e iiii wDschoolingX l =+++ ￿                (2) 
 
where D(schooling) denotes dummies for different levels of schooling and 
b is interpreted as the wage premium of that certain level or year of 
schooling. In a number of studies the non-linearities at 12 and 16 years of 
schooling have been empirically confirmed in US data. In some of these 
studies these findings have been interpreted as sheepskin effects, i.e. when 
completion of a certain year of schooling that normally leads to some kind 
of diploma acquires for the individual an extra wage premium. 
Equation (2) is the basis of most of the previous research on sheepskin 
effects in the United States. However, the data used in some of these 
studies do not contain any information about the individuals’ actual 
diplomas (Hungerford & Solon, (1987) and Belman & Heywood, (1997)), 
see  Table 1. Instead, these studies are based on a modified version of 
equation (2), using a discontinuous function for disproportionately large 
increases in the return to schooling for those years that usually lead to a 
diploma. The discontinuities in this case are expressed as dummy variables 
for S‡8, S‡12 and S‡16, where these dummy variables are thought of as 
capturing the sheepskin effects.  
Other studies are based on information about individuals’ actual degrees 
but utilize different approaches. Jaeger & Page (1996) and Arkes (1999) 
use a model that is discontinuous for each educational level (e.g. high 
school, college etc.). Arkes also includes a dummy variable for received   4
diploma as well as information about AFQT scores.
1 On the other hand, 
Park (1999) adds interaction terms for different levels of schooling into the 
equation. This means an interaction between years of schooling and highest 
diploma/degree obtained, expressed as D(degree)*D(years of schooling 
completed). The sheepskin effects are then interpreted for e.g. a bachelor’s 
degree as the estimated coefficient for the interaction term D(years of 
schooling=16)* D(degree =university).  
Nevertheless, there are potential flaws in all these studies. First, the 
assumption that individuals take their exams in the standard number of 
years might lead to a bias in the estimated sheepskin effects for the reason 
that many individuals do not do so (see for example Björklund & 
Kjellström (1999), Jaeger & Page (1996) or Table 8 in the Appendix). In 
addition, the studies might also capture an effect of going from e.g. 15 to 
16 years of schooling. This could lead to an over-estimation of the 
sheepskin effects as it then also includes the education effect. 
 
Table 1. Previous studies on sheepskin effects. 
  Hungerford & 
Solon (1987) 
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Note: The sheepskin effects for Belman & Heywood (1997) are the average sheepskin effects 
computed for the significant coefficients. 
*** denotes coefficients significantly different from 
zero at the 1 % level, 
** at the 5 % level and 
* at the 10 % level. 
                                                   
1 Armed Forces Qualification Test, the score is the sum of arithmetic reasoning score, word knowledge 
score, paragraph comprehension score and one-half the numerical operations score.   5
 
Indirectly, Jaeger & Page (1996) do account for the presence of an 
education effect by letting each year of schooling as well as the highest 
diploma received enter the equation as dummy variables. The authors 
compare a wage equation regressed without any information as to received 
diploma with a regressed wage equation including such information. The 
difference between the estimated coefficients for the years of schooling 
from the two equations might then be interpreted as sheepskin effects. 
However, there is a risk that the estimated sheepskin effect for different 
diplomas is biased for individuals who do not complete their diplomas in 
the standard number of years. 
In the following, another approach  is presented for capturing a 
potential education effect when estimating sheepskin effects. The starting 
point is to estimate wage differentials between individuals who have 
completed their university studies with a degree and individuals with some 
university studies but no degree. Running separate wage regressions for the 
two groups moderates the assumption of similar coefficient values for the 
variables included in the wage equation in the approaches of previous 
studies. The wage differentials between the two groups are then analyzed 
by the well-known Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition procedure, which 
computes one explained part and one unexplained part of the wage 
differentials. In particular the following formula is applied: 
 
 
''' lnln()ß(ßß) DNDNN DDN wwXXX -=-+- $$$
           (3) 
 
where  wD is the hourly earnings for the group of individuals with a 
university degree and wN is the hourly earnings for the group of individuals 
with no degree but who have attended university.  X is a vector of 
explanatory variables and b is a vector of estimated parameters. The first 
expression on the right-hand side of equation (3) is the explained part and 
the second expression is the unexplained part. The unexplained part is 
interpreted as the maximum part of the wage differentials that can be 
attributed to sheepskin effects.  
The education effect will arise on average as SD > SND, where SD is 
average years of schooling for those who have received a degree and SND 
the average years of schooling for those who have attended university but 
not attained a degree. As this component is included in the X vector, this 
makes it possible to consider the education effect apart from the sheepskin 
effect. 
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III. Data and regression results 
 
My estimations rely on the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey, a data 
set based on interviews combined with register data (for details see Fritzell 
and Lundberg, (1994)). The sample consists of individuals who have 
received their education mainly within the Swedish school system. Further, 
only individuals aged 24 – 65 are included, as more likely to have finished 
their studies. 
Agricultural employees and the self-employed are excluded from the 
sample due to the difficulties of approximating their hourly earnings. 
Individuals who have not reported any wage and those who were not 
employed at the time are also excluded from the sample.  
This leaves a sample of 2,571 respondents, of whom 1,304 are men 
and 1,267 women. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of 
individuals used. The average age in the sample of employees aged 25-64 
is 42 years. The male/female balance is almost even. The average number 
of years of education is 11.7; 17 per cent have a university degree and 21 
per cent have a high school diploma. The average wage in 1991 was 83,4 
SEK per hour. 
Years of schooling completed are transformed into dummy variables 
starting with 9 years or fewer and ending with 18 or more years of 
completed schooling, which implies the following construction of the 
dummy variable: S < 9 (D9), S=10 (D10),...., S‡18 (D18).  
The variable “highest received formal education” is a categorical 
dummy. The first category contains the individuals who have received a 
university degree. The second category contains the individuals who have 
attended university for one or more years but not completed a degree. 
Finally, the third category contains the individuals with a high school 
diploma. Due to the limitations of my data I cannot make a distinction 
between the 2-year, more vocational type and the 3–year, more theoretical 
type of high school education in Sweden. Obvious discrepancies between 
years of schooling and educational level according to SUN (Swedish 
Education Nomenclature) have been corrected.   7
 
       Table 2. Sample characteristics. 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Age  42.1  10.8 
Years of education  11.7    3.2 
Years of work experience  20.4  11.1 
Wage (SEK per hour)  83.4  28.3 
ln wage  4.38  0.29 
Sector (1 if private)  0.53  0.50 
Big city (1 if big)  0.28  0.45 
Sex (1 if male)  0.51  0.50 
Completed years of education: 
 9  0.28  0.45 
10  0.09  0.28 
11  0.16  0.37 
12  0.10  0.30 
13  0.08  0.27 
14  0.10  0.31 
15  0.06  0.25 
16  0.05  0.21 
17  0.04  0.19 
18  0.05  0.21 
Highest credential:     
University degree  0.17  0.38 
Some university (no degree)  0.04  0.21 
High school diploma  0.21  0.41 
Some high school (no diploma)  0.03  0.17 
 





       Note: Own calculations from the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey. 
 
Table 3 shows characteristics of those who  have a university degree 
compared to those who have attended university but not completed a 
degree. The characteristics of both groups are in many ways similar with 
two main exceptions. First, those who have a university degree have 
relatively more years of schooling on average and less work experience. 
Second, the hourly wage on average is higher (as expected) for those who 
have a university degree. The wage difference is about 6 per cent.   8
 
Table 3. Sample characteristics for university groups. 
Variable  University degree  No university degree 
  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev 
Sex (1 if male)  0.46  0.50  0.49  0.50 
Average age  41.2  9.9  41.1  11.3 
Years of education  16.1  2.1  14.6  1.4 
Years of work experience  16.0  9.4  18.2  11.9 
Big city (1 if big)  0.41  0.49  0.42  0.50 
Wage (SEK per hour)  100.3  36.5  94.8  40.5 
ln wage  4.55  0.31  4.49  0.34 
 









        Note: Own calculations from the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey. 
 
Table 4 reports findings from three different types of specifications of wage 
equations often used when estimating sheepskin effects. In all of the 
models the years of schooling are entered as discontinuities, expressed as 
separate dummies for each year. The first specification represents the 
baseline model and includes no information about the actual diploma. In 
the second model two dummy variables are introduced, one representing 
high school diplomas and the other representing university degrees. This is 
supposed to cleanse the returns to schooling from a possible diploma effect. 
Finally, the third model introduces a dummy variable for partial university 
studies. This variable is introduced in order to investigate whether merely 
attending a university for a time signals something about productivity/abi-
lity that employers find worthwhile.  
All of the estimated coefficients have the expected signs. In model (1) 
the estimated coefficients are all significant at the 1 % level. The estimated 
coefficients for the control variables are all standard signs. One additional 
year of experience gives close to two per cent in wages. Male wages and 
private sector wages are on average 10 per cent higher than female and 
public sector wages.  Wages in the three largest cities in Sweden are 
approximately seven per cent higher than in the rest of the country.  
The same is valid in model (2). Further, in the third model the only 
insignificant coefficient is the dummy representing partial university 
education. Finally, a control for partial high school education was included 
but it turns out not to be significant   9
 Table 4. Estimated sheepskin effects, using different specifictions. 
                     Model  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Constant  3.825     (0.023)  3.806     (0.023)  3.805     (0.023) 
       
Experience   0.018     (0.002)   0.019     (0.002)   0.019     (0.002) 
Experience
2  -0.000     (0.000)  -0.000     (0.000)  -0.000     (0.000) 
Gender (Male=1)   0.116     (0.009)   0.115     (0.010)   0.115     (0.010) 
Sector (Private=1)   0.105     (0.010)   0.106     (0.010)   0.106     (0.010) 
Urban (metropolitan=1)   0.071     (0.011)   0.071     (0.011)   0.070     (0.011) 
       
Completed years of education (dummies:) 
9 or less  ref.  ref.  ref. 
10  0.098     (0.017)  0.098     (0.017)  0.098     (0.171) 
11  0.124     (0.014)  0.101     (0.016)  0.100     (0.016) 
12  0.148     (0.017)  0.132     (0.017)  0.131     (0.017) 
13  0.219     (0.020)  0.200     (0.021)  0.197     (0.021) 
14  0.273     (0.018)  0.239     (0.020)  0.231     (0.022) 
15  0.358     (0.025)  0.321     (0.027)  0.315     (0.029) 
16  0.436     (0.029)  0.396     (0.032)  0.390     (0.034) 
17  0.413     (0.029)  0.365     (0.031)  0.358     (0.032) 
18 or more  0.439     (0.030)  0.389     (0.031)  0.383     (0.032) 
 
Diploma effects: 
High school diploma  -  0.050     (0.014)  0.053     (0.014) 
Some university, no degree  -  -  0.022     (0.030) 
University degree  -  0.070     (0.020)  0.077     (0.022) 
R
2  0.347  0.353  0.353 
Number of observations  2,571  2,571  2,571 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's robust 
standard errors; estimation method OLS. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. The 
percentage increase in wages associated with a dummy variable coefficient is to be calculated as 
e
b - 1. 
 
One way of looking at the results presented in Table 4 is to interpret the 
estimated coefficients for each diploma—high school or university—as the 
sheepskin effect of that particular diploma. For reasons discussed in the 
previous section,  this could lead to an overestimation of the sheepskin 
effects since individuals with a diploma on average (see  Table 3) have 
more schooling. A more appropriate way to interpret the results is to 
compare the estimated coefficients from model (1) with the same 
coefficients from model (2) or model (3). Table 5 presents these differences 
in estimated schooling coefficients between model (1) and (2). The 
differences might be interpreted as the part of the total returns to schooling 
that are due to sheepskin effects.   10
Table 5. Implied sheepskin effects, models (1) – (2). 
Completed years of 
schooling 
Estimated coeff- 
cients in model (1) 
Estimated coeffi- 
cients in model (2) 
Implied sheepskin 
effects: (1) - (2) 
10  0.098  0.098  0 
11  0.124  0.101  0.023 
12  0.148  0.132  0.016 
13  0.219  0.200  0.019 
14  0.273  0.239  0.034 
15  0.358  0.321  0.037 
16  0.436  0.396  0.004 
17  0.413  0.365  0.048 
18  0.439  0.389  0.05 
Note: The implied sheepskin effects are computed as the estimated coefficients for each year of 
schooling in column (1) minus the same coefficients in column (2). 
 
However, this means that the average sheepskin effect for each particular 
year of schooling is obtained. This could lead to a bias of the implied 
sheepskin effect since many students do not complete their exams in the 
standard number of years (see Appendix,  Table 8). For example, the 
implied sheepskin effect for 16 years of schooling in Table 5 represents 
both a high school diploma and a university degree. Since the sheepskin 
effect from the former should be lower than from the latter it is obvious 
that the implied sheepskin effect is downward biased for university and 
upward biased for high school in this example.  
A more appropriate way of estimating sheepskin effects is to compare 
individuals who have studied at the same level (e.g. university). By using 
the Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition method it is possible to cleanse 
the sheepskin effects from a potential education effect. 
The group of individuals with partial university education serves as a 
control group and is compared with the group with university degrees. As 
this method forces the two groups to take the same values on the right-hand 
side of the wage equation, the unexplained part of the decomposition can 
be interpreted as the maximum amount of sheepskin effects. The outcome 
of this computation is that the sheepskin effect for university studies is 9.3 
% at maximum.  
The result from the computation for high school suggests that the 
sheepskin effect is at maximum 1.6 %. The explanation for  the large 
discrepancy between this result and the outcome in model (2) in Table 4 is 
that the dummy variable in the second model is interpreted against the 
constant term. This constant term will include all individuals with different 
educational attainment below a high school diploma. This suggests that the 
“dummy variable-model” might be too restrictive and that the use of the   11




IV. On diminishing sheepskin effects 
 
Sheepskin  effects are supposed to arise from an information problem. 
Suppose that the firm has two decisions to make when hiring and offering 
wages. First, each job is associated with a certain level of productivity and 
the firm has to decide whether or not to hire a certain individual for the job. 
Second, the firm must offer a wage to the (hired) individual. While the 
market determines the average wage for that particular job, the individual 
wage can deviate from the average wage. This is due to uncertainty about 
the true productivity of the individual employee. But as tenure increases, 
the employers can directly observe the individual’s productivity, which 
allows them to correct the wage. This then raises the interesting question, 
how soon will the employers learn about the employee’s true level of 
productivity? 
This issue has been empirically investigated in two previous studies 
that have focused on the hypothesis of diminishing sheepskin effects with 
increasing tenure. Liu & Wong (1982) used a Mincer wage equation and 
included information about highest diploma in terms of dummy variables. 
The equation was then regressed conditional upon groups of overlapping 
tenure intervals. The findings suggest that the high school diploma effect 
will disappear after 2 to 4 years of tenure in the firm and the bachelor’s 
degree effect after 4 to 6 years. Belman & Heywood (1997) also found 
evidence of diminishing sheepskin effects by utilizing another approach. 
They divided the sample into cohorts and investigated whether or not 
sheepskin effects differ across cohorts. The implicit assumption is that 
older individuals have had longer tenure.  
In the following, a modified version of the wage-screening test used 
by Liu & Wong (1982) is utilized. In particular, the estimation is 
conditional upon the individual’s years of tenure in the current firm. This 
leads to the following model: 
 
123 ln()() ijijjijijij wXDdegreeDschooling fgggh =++++           (4) 
 
where subindex  j denotes the  jth tenure interval. If the hypothesis is 
supported by the data the sheepskin effects should attenuate as tenure in the 
firm increases, i.e. g2 should diminish.    12
Table 6 presents the results from estimating equation (4) on six tenure 
intervals. Due to the small number of observations when estimating 
conditional upon tenure, it is not possible to utilize the earlier mentioned 
method of wage decomposition. Instead the results are interpreted in terms 
of the pattern of dummy coefficients representing a university degree and a 
high school diploma, and the implied sheepskin effects. 
First, analysis of the diploma effects in terms of dummy coefficients 
tells a rather straightforward story. The diploma effects increase slightly at 
the beginning of tenure, but after the individuals have been working in the 
firm for about 2 to 4 years the effects start to  attenuate and disappear 
completely after 3 to 5 years for high school diplomas and 4 to 6 years for 
university degrees. 
 
Table 6. Estimating attenuating sheepskin effects, with overlapping intervals. 
  0<= t =>2  1<= t =>3  2<= t =>4  3<= t =>5  4<= t =>6  5<= t =>7 















Completed years of education (dummies) 
9  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref. 

























































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's robust standard errors; estimation method 
OLS. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. The model also includes general experience (calculated as work experience minus 
tenure in current firm), general experience squared, and control variables for sector (private sector employees = 1), big city 
(metropolitan dwelling = 1), and gender (males = 1). The percentage increase in wages associated with a dummy variable is 
calculated as e
b - 1. 
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Table 7 presents the implied sheepskin effects and tells the same story as 
the dummy coefficients. A slight increase in sheepskin effects can be 
observed at the beginning of tenure, but then they start to attenuate and 
have vanished after 3 to 5 years for a high school diploma and 4 to 6 years 
for a university degree. It is worth noting that the size of the sheepskin 
effects might be biased for reasons described in the previous section. 
Nevertheless, the important aspect of these results is the pattern of 
diminishing sheepskin effects with increasing tenure in the firm. 
 





0-2               1-3 
 
2-4 






10  0  0.003  0  -0.003  -0.009  -0.001 
11  0.037  0.062  0.039  -0.024  -0.031  -0.006 
12  0.033  0.045  0.030  -0.020  -0.022  -0.002 
13  0.027  0.045  0.019  -0.020  -0.029  -0.007 
14  0.064  0.074  0.060   0.031  -0.009   0.012 
15  0.082  0.099  0.066   0.045  -0.007   0.012 
16  0.096  0.086  0.052   0.057   0.002   0.016 
17  0.088  0.105  0.095   0.076  -0.012   0.018 
18  0.078  0.092  0.084   0.062  -0.001   0.025 





This paper reports the empirical investigation of two hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis concerns the existence of sheepskin effects when estimating 
returns to schooling in the Swedish labor market. The empirical analysis 
reports evidence of such sheepskin effects at both high school and 
university level. The paper also highlights several difficulties in estimating 
sheepskin effects and suggests a new approach that takes into consideration 
a potential education effect that might affect such estimations. By using the 
Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition method the unexplained part could be 
interpreted as the maximum part of the wage differentials that could be due 
to sheepskin effects. The fact that these effects are considerably lower than 
in previous US studies is in line with the fact that in general the estimated 
return to schooling is lower in the Swedish data than in US data. 
The second hypothesis concerns the signaling value to employers of 
educational credentials as indicators of the individual’s productivity. As 
tenure increases, the employer gains more information about the 
employee’s true productivity and will adjust the wage accordingly. 
Diminishing sheepskin effects with increasing tenure in the firm indicate   14
empirical support for this hypothesis. The results suggest that sheepskin 
effects for a high school diploma will completely disappear after 3 to 5 
years and for a university degree after 4 to 6 years of tenure in the firm. 
In conclusion, diplomas do matter when calculating the private return to 
schooling, but only initially—as signaling and screening mechanisms. As 
employers gain more information about their employees in terms of 
productivity, the sheepskin effects attenuate. However, whether this 
information problem only occurs when an employee is entering the labor 
market for the first time or every time s/he changes to a new job must be a 
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Appendix 
 
Table 8. Cross-tabulation between years of schooling and different educational 
groups. 
Years of schooling  High school diploma  Some university  
but no degree    
University degree 
<=9  0  0  0 
10  12  0  0 
11  242  0  0 
12  108  0  0 
13  101  19  0 
14  37  52  121 
15  20  17  86 
16  6  11  74 
17  3  9  74 
>=18  5  5  92 
Note: Own calculations from the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey. 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for the different tenure intervals. 
Tenure intervals, in 
years. 
 
0 - 2 
 
1 - 3 
 
2 - 4 
 
3 - 5 
 
4 - 6 
 
5 - 7 
Years of education  12.5  12.1  12.2  12.2  11.9  12.1 
ln wage  4.33  4.33  4.36  4.37  4.38  4.40 
St. Dev. of ln wage  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.29  0.29 
High school dipl. 
(%) 
22  20  40  28  31  26 
University  degree 
(%) 
24  21  19  16  15  18 
No. of observations  432  398  336  280  239  207 
Note: Own calculations from the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey. 
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